In a democracy, Bayrou would have won. Application of the Borda Fixed Point method to the 2007 French presidential elections Report as inadecuate




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Abstract

Democratic nations are advised to have parliaments select the chief executive by the Borda Fixed Point method. The current practice of having direct popular elections using systems that have originated in history is inoptimal and actually quite undemocratic since winners are selected who don’t reflect the national sentiment. The paper gives the example of the 2007 French presidential elections. Under the currently and historically grown system of run-off plurality Sarkozy got elected while the more democratic method of Borda Fixed Point would have generated Bayrou. The example uses reasonable assumptions on underlying micro preferences. The parliamentary vote that followed the presidential vote and that annihilated Bayrou increased the paradox but not the principles involved.



Item Type: MPRA Paper -

Institution: Thomas Cool Consultancy and Econometrics-

Original Title: In a democracy, Bayrou would have won. Application of the Borda Fixed Point method to the 2007 French presidential elections-

Language: English-

Keywords: voting theory; voting systems; elections; public choice; political economy; run-off plurality; Borda Fixed Point; democracy-

Subjects: D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D71 - Social Choice ; Clubs ; Committees ; AssociationsA - General Economics and Teaching > A2 - Economic Education and Teaching of EconomicsH - Public Economics > H0 - General-





Author: Colignatus, Thomas

Source: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/3726/



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