Cena węgla brunatnego jako wyznacznik podziału zysku w układach kopalń i elektrowni. Część I – Propozycje podziału Report as inadecuate




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Abstract

Different structures of lignite mines and power stations, which have appeared on the Polish market as a result of its transformation and the privatisation, were discussed. The attention is focused on the fact that the practice is overtaking the theory because there is lack of models of functioning of such structures. A model of cooperation between the mine and the power station was worked out for the established amount of coal what can describe the situation of particular ultimate pit choice in long run or realization of supplies of the constant amount of lignite in frames of the long-term contract in short run e.g. one of year. It is proposed to treat a negotiation of the lignite price as a constant sum game and a lignite price as the determinant of the total profit division. The choice of lignite price between prices outlining break-even points of the mine and the power station determines the distribution of the profit to both sides. It is similar to the contract curve in the classical bilateral monopoly model. Ten different methods of the profit division are proposed. Argumentation speaking for proposed solutions was presented favouring the pro-posal of equal profit margins calculated without the costs of fuel purchase.



Item Type: MPRA Paper -

Institution: Institute of Mining Engineering at Wroclaw University of Technology-

Original Title: Cena węgla brunatnego jako wyznacznik podziału zysku w układach kopalń i elektrowni. Część I – Propozycje podziału-

English Title: Lignite price as a determinant of the split of profit in systems of mines and power plants. Part I – Split of profit proposals-

Language: Polish-

Keywords: Bilateral monopoly; pit optimisation; bargaining; price negotiation; fair division; Nash bargaining solution; Kalai-Smorodinsky solution; lignite price; lignite mine; lignite power plant; coal mine; coal power plant-

Subjects: R - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics > R3 - Real Estate Markets, Spatial Production Analysis, and Firm Location > R32 - Other Spatial Production and Pricing AnalysisL - Industrial Organization > L2 - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior > L22 - Firm Organization and Market StructureL - Industrial Organization > L7 - Industry Studies: Primary Products and Construction > L72 - Mining, Extraction, and Refining: Other Nonrenewable ResourcesQ - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics ; Environmental and Ecological Economics > Q3 - Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation > Q31 - Demand and Supply ; PricesL - Industrial Organization > L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance > L14 - Transactional Relationships ; Contracts and Reputation ; NetworksD - Microeconomics > D4 - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design > D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market ImperfectionQ - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics ; Environmental and Ecological Economics > Q4 - Energy > Q41 - Demand and Supply ; PricesD - Microeconomics > D4 - Market Structure, Pricing, and DesignC - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C72 - Noncooperative GamesL - Industrial Organization > L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance > L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect MarketsL - Industrial Organization > L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance > L10 - GeneralC - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching TheoryL - Industrial Organization > L4 - Antitrust Issues and Policies > L42 - Vertical Restraints ; Resale Price Maintenance ; Quantity DiscountsL - Industrial Organization > L0 - GeneralD - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D86 - Economics of Contract: TheoryL - Industrial Organization > L9 - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities > L94 - Electric UtilitiesC - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C71 - Cooperative GamesC - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining TheoryQ - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics ; Environmental and Ecological Economics > Q3 - Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation > Q32 - Exhaustible Resources and Economic Development-





Author: Jurdziak, Leszek

Source: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2384/



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