Iterated Potential and Robustness of Equilibria Report as inadecuate




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Abstract

For any given set-valued solution concept, it is possible to consider iterative elimination of actions outside the solution set. This paper applies such a procedure to define the concept of iterated monotone potential maximizer iterated MP-maximizer. It is shown that under some monotonicity conditions, an iterated MP-maximizer is robust to incomplete information Kajii and Morris, Econometrica 65 1997 and absorbing and globally accessible under perfect foresight dynamics for a small friction Matsui and Matsuyama, Journal of Economic Theory 65 1995. Several simple sufficient conditions under which a game has an iterated MP-maximizer are also provided.



Item Type: MPRA Paper -

Original Title: Iterated Potential and Robustness of Equilibria-

Language: English-

Keywords: equilibrium selection; robustness; incomplete information; perfect foresight dynamics; iteration; monotone potential; p-dominance-

Subjects: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C72 - Noncooperative GamesD - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; Mechanism DesignC - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games ; Evolutionary Games ; Repeated Games-





Author: Oyama, Daisuke

Source: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/1599/







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