Leveraging the Honor Code: Public Goods Contributions under OathReport as inadecuate

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1 ETH Zurich 2 CES - Centre d-économie de la Sorbonne 3 PSE - Paris School of Economics 4 GREQAM - Groupement de Recherche en Économie Quantitative d-Aix-Marseille 5 Departement of Economics and Finance, University of Wyoming

Abstract : Real economic commitment or the lack of it of others affects a person-s preferences to cooperate. But what if the commitment of others cannot be observed ex ante? Herein we examine how a classic non-monetary institution– a solemn oath of honesty –creates economic commitment within the public goods game. Commitment-through-the-oath asks people to hold themselves to a higher standard of integrity. Our results suggest the oath can increase cooperation by 33%– but the oath does not change preferences for cooperation. Rather people react quicker and cooperate, taking less time to ponder on the strategic free riding behavior.

Keywords : WorkingPublic good game Social Preference Truth Keywords: Public good game

Author: Jérôme Hergueux - Nicolas Jacquemet - Stéphane Luchini - Jason Shogren -

Source: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/


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