Formal Analysis of Electronic ExamsReport as inadecuate

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1 CASSIS - Combination of approaches to the security of infinite states systems FEMTO-ST - Franche-Comté Électronique Mécanique, Thermique et Optique - Sciences et Technologies, Inria Nancy - Grand Est, LORIA - FM - Department of Formal Methods 2 SICS - Swedish ICT 3 VERIMAG - IMAG - VERIMAG 4 LIMOS - Laboratoire d-Informatique, de Modélisation et d-optimisation des Systèmes 5 University of Luxembourg Luxembourg

Abstract : Universities and other educational organizations are adopting computer and Internet-based assessment tools herein called e-exams to reach widespread audiences. While this makes examination tests more accessible, it exposes them to new threats. At present, there are very few strategies to check such systems for security, also there is a lack of formal security definitions in this domain. This paper fills this gap: in the formal framework of the applied π-calculus, we define several fundamental authentication and privacy properties and establish the first theoretical framework for the security analysis of e-exam protocols. As proof of concept we analyze two of such protocols with ProVerif. The first - secure electronic exam system - proposed in the literature turns out to have several severe problems. The second protocol, called Remark!, is proved to satisfy all the security properties assuming access control on the bulletin board. We propose a simple protocol modification that removes the need of such assumption though guaranteeing all the security properties.

Keywords : Electronic Exams Formal Verification Authentication Privacy Applied π-Calculus ProVerif

Author: Jannik Dreier - Rosario Giustolisi - Ali Kassem - Pascal Lafourcade - Gabriele Lenzini - Peter Ryan -



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