Formal Verification of e-Auction ProtocolsReport as inadecuate

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1 CASSIS - Combination of approaches to the security of infinite states systems FEMTO-ST - Franche-Comté Électronique Mécanique, Thermique et Optique - Sciences et Technologies, Inria Nancy - Grand Est, LORIA - FM - Department of Formal Methods 2 LIMOS - Laboratoire d-Informatique, de Modélisation et d-optimisation des Systèmes 3 VERIMAG - IMAG - VERIMAG

Abstract : Auctions have a long history, having been recorded as early as 500 B.C

With the rise of Internet, electronic auctions have been a great success and are increasingly used. Many cryptographic protocols have been proposed to address the various security requirements of these electronic transactions. We propose a formal framework to analyze and verify security properties of e-Auction protocols. We model protocols in the Applied π-Calculus and define privacy notions, which include secrecy of bids, anonymity of the participants, receipt-freeness and coercion-resistance. We also discuss fairness, non-repudiation and non-cancellation. Additionally we show on two case studies how these properties can be verified automatically using ProVerif, and discover several attacks.

Author: Jannik Dreier - Pascal Lafourcade - Yassine Lakhnech -



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