On the value of partial commitment for cooperative investment in buyer-supplier relationshipReport as inadecuate




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1 CES - Centre d-économie de la Sorbonne 2 ADIS - Analyse des Dynamiques Industrielles et Sociales 3 TEPP - Travail, Emploi et Politiques Publiques 4 GAINS - Groupe d-Analyse des Itinéraires et des Niveaux Salariaux

Abstract : Does formal contracting foster cooperation in a buyer-supplier relationship? In line with the literature, we find that a renegotiable contract with relationshipspecific joint investments does not make it possible to reach the first-best. However, we show that a renegotiable contract may induce more cooperation than an informal arrangement can. This result may help to understand how cooperation emerges in Japanese procurement practices, which typically involve relationshipspecific joint investments and renegotiable contracts.

Keywords : incomplete contracts relationship-specific investments cooperation





Author: José De Sousa - Xavier Fairise -

Source: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/



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