International trade and strategic behaviour: a game theoretical analysis of the trade dispute between Turkey and RussiaReport as inadecuate




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Economic research - Ekonomska istraživanja, Vol.30 No.1 January 2017. online first -

Starting from the premise that strategic interactions between

countries influence trade policy decisions, this paper is a first attempt

at exploring the possible outcomes of a trade dispute between Turkey

and Russia, assuming that Turkey can lodge a complaint about Russia’s

protectionist move to the WTO Dispute Settlement Body DSB.

Employing the course of events during the recent economic conflict

between the two countries, the article models the stages of a trade

game wherein players exhibit non-cooperative behaviour. It finds

that Turkey reporting Russia to the DSB depends on the cost of the

dispute, which represents both economic losses and losses that can

be considered disadvantages in a broader sense. The results show that

in trade relations where asymmetric interdependence is observed,

if both parties mutually commit to an international organisation,

binding regulations may provide strategy options that are otherwise

infeasible for the disadvantaged player.

Turkey; Russia; trade dispute; trade policy; World Trade Organization



Author: Aslı Taşbaşı -

Source: http://hrcak.srce.hr/



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