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Synthesis philosophica, Vol.29 No.1 November 2014. -

The relation between moral phenomenology and moral theory is dealt with. The aims in the paper involve the following: clarifying the notion of moral phenomenology, especially the impact that it has on moral theory; interpreting the discussion between moral cognitivism and non-cognitivism in the light of moral phenomenology; presenting the most recent position of cognitive expressivism concerning this debate; pointing out the main shortcomings of this theory, especially in respect to the purported objectivity of moral judgements. Cognitive expressivism still leaves a gap between the immediate features of our internal moral psychology and their theoretical explanation, thereby losing much of its apparent phenomenological support. A proper understanding of the purported phenomenological objectivity is proposed along with its consequences for moral theory.

moral phenomenology; moral theory; objectivity; cognitivism; non-cognitivism; cognitive expressivism; belief; truth; moral realism

Author: Matjaž Potrč - ; University of Ljubljana, Faculty of Arts, Ljubljana, Slovenia Vojko Strahovnik -



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