BENCHMARKING, SAFEGUARD CLAUSES AND VERIFICATION MECHANISMS - WHAT’S IN A NAME RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN PRE- AND POST-ACCESSION CONDITIONALITY AND COMPLIANCE WITH EU LAWReport as inadecuate




BENCHMARKING, SAFEGUARD CLAUSES AND VERIFICATION MECHANISMS - WHAT’S IN A NAME RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN PRE- AND POST-ACCESSION CONDITIONALITY AND COMPLIANCE WITH EU LAW - Download this document for free, or read online. Document in PDF available to download.

Croatian yearbook of European law & policy, Vol.3. No.3. November 2007. -

Summary: This article looks upon the most recent developments in the European Union’s

accession strategies, as from the start of accession negotiations. It first seeks to

demonstrate that the pre-accession conditionality rationale of stabilising present and

protecting future integration objectives underpins the so-called ‘specific safeguard

clauses’ of the 2003 and 2005 Acts of Accession and the latter’s cooperation and

verification mechanism, accordingly referred to as post-accession conditionality tools. It

then argues that this rationale, emphasised also in the imperative of maintaining the

momentum of European integration of the Union’s ‘integration capacity’, above all

necessitates effective compliance with EU law, and thus full administrative and judicial

capacity of prospective Member States. Indeed, the lynchpin of these new conditionality

devices evokes putting them in the wider context of compliance mechanisms in the

enlarged European Union. It thereby becomes apparent how conditionality has lead to a

considerable empowerment of the European Commission which, when reaching into the

post-accession phase, entails a problematic differentiation between the Member States.

Conditionality methodology furthermore, and this is equally shown, has had an impact

on the Commission’s role as ‘guardian of the treaty’ within the overall system of

ensuring compliance with EU law.



Author: Martina Spernbauer -

Source: http://hrcak.srce.hr/



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