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Experimental Economics

, Volume 12, Issue 3, pp 253–271

First Online: 24 June 2009Received: 10 July 2007Accepted: 11 June 2009


We experimentally test the predictive success of three stationary concepts in two cyclic duopoly games. The concepts are Nash equilibrium, impulse-balance equilibrium and payoff-sampling equilibrium. In the experiment 11 independent subject groups, consisting out of six participants interacting over 200 rounds, were gathered for each game. The comparison of the three concepts with mixed strategies shows that the order of performance from best to worst is as follows: payoff-sampling equilibrium, impulse-balance equilibrium, and Nash equilibrium. In addition the data exhibit a weak but significant tendency over time in the direction of coordination at a pure strategy equilibrium.

KeywordsCyclic game duopoly experiment Impulse-balance equilibrium Payoff-sampling equilibrium Electronic Supplementary MaterialThe online version of this article 10.1007-s10683-009-9218-8 contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.

JEL ClassificationC73 D43 C90  Download to read the full article text

Author: Sebastian J. Goerg - Reinhard Selten

Source: https://link.springer.com/


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