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Abstract: We propose models for lobbying in a probabilistic environment, in which anactor called -The Lobby- seeks to influence voters- preferences of voting foror against multiple issues when the voters- preferences are represented interms of probabilities. In particular, we provide two evaluation criteria andtwo bribery methods to formally describe these models, and we consider theresulting forms of lobbying with and without issue weighting. We provide aformal analysis for these problems of lobbying in a stochastic environment, anddetermine their classical and parameterized complexity depending on the givenbribery-evaluation criteria and on various natural parameterizations.Specifically, we show that some of these problems can be solved in polynomialtime, some are NP-complete but fixed-parameter tractable, and some areW2-complete. Finally, we provide approximability and inapproximabilityresults for these problems and several variants.

Author: Daniel Binkele-Raible, Gábor Erdélyi, Henning Fernau, Judy Goldsmith, Nicholas Mattei, Jörg Rothe


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