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THEORIA. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 2009, 24 1

Author: Joan Pagès

Source: http://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=339730808003


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THEORIA.
Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia ISSN: 0495-4548 theoria@ehu.es Universidad del País Vasco-Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea España Pagès, Joan Truthmakers for Negatives THEORIA.
Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia, vol.
24, núm.
1, 2009, pp.
49-61 Universidad del País Vasco-Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea Donostia-San Sebastián, España Available in: http:--www.redalyc.org-articulo.oa?id=339730808003 How to cite Complete issue More information about this article Journals homepage in redalyc.org Scientific Information System Network of Scientific Journals from Latin America, the Caribbean, Spain and Portugal Non-profit academic project, developed under the open access initiative Truthmakers for Negatives Joan PAGÈS Recibido: 2.12.2007 Versión Final: 29.4.2008 BIBLID [0495-4548 (2009) 24: 64; pp.
49-61] ABSTRACT: In this paper I will first present and defend Molnar’s way of setting out the problem of finding truthmakers for negative propositions.
Secondly, I will reply to two objections to what in my view is the most promising general approach to the problem of negatives.
Finally, I will present and defend Cheyne and Pidgen’s specific proposal that falls under that general promising approach. Keywords: metaphysics, truth, truthmakers, negative propositions, negative ontology. 1.
Introduction Truthmaker theorists hold that at least for some true propositions there is something in the world that makes them true and call this thesis “the truthmaker principle”.
Entities playing this role are described as the truthmakers of the propositions that they make true.
Any truth, then, depends on their truthmakers, is grounded in them, and is true in virtue of them.
Something worldly, different from the proposition, grounds and explains its truth.
Most common accounts of the notion of truthmaker include as a necessary condition for being a truthmaker of a proposition that truthmakers should be metaphysically ...





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