Transboundary Renewable Resource Management: A Dynamic Game with Differing Non-Cooperative Payoffs Report as inadecuate




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Abstract

Recent conflicts over fish stocks, such as salmon and turbot, have revived public interest in the optimal management of transboundary renewable natural resources. Given that enforcement of binding contracts is often a major obstacle, dynamically consistent or self-enforcing contracting, as proposed by Vislie 1987, must be relied upon. A more general model is developed which recognizes that, in the absence of a cooperative agreement, two countries may enjoy differing economic payoffs. The predictions of the model are consistent with and provide insights into the particulars of the recent disputes.



Item Type: MPRA Paper -

Original Title: Transboundary Renewable Resource Management: A Dynamic Game with Differing Non-Cooperative Payoffs-

Language: English-

Keywords: Conservation, economic theory, natural resource management, game theory, optimal control theory, fisheries management, renewable.-

Subjects: Q - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics ; Environmental and Ecological Economics > Q2 - Renewable Resources and ConservationQ - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics ; Environmental and Ecological Economics > Q2 - Renewable Resources and Conservation > Q22 - Fishery ; AquacultureQ - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics ; Environmental and Ecological Economics > Q2 - Renewable Resources and Conservation > Q28 - Government Policy-





Author: Ida, Ferrara

Source: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/70749/







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