Transboundary Renewable Resource Management and Conservation Motives Report as inadecuate




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Abstract

A simple, two-country theoretical model of transboundary fishing conflicts in which one country has a nonlucrative incentive to conserve the fish stock is presented to examine the effect of such a conservation motive on the steady state stock level and to analyze how this stock level is affected by the division of the harvest. It is demonstrated that a conservation motive for one or both countries serves to increase the stock level and that this level is dependent on the harvest share of the country with the motive. A brief application to the Canada-European Union turbot and Canada-United States salmon disputes suggests consistency between the principles of the model and reality.



Item Type: MPRA Paper -

Original Title: Transboundary Renewable Resource Management and Conservation Motives-

Language: English-

Keywords: Conservation, natural resource management, game theory, optimal control theory, fisheries managment, turbot, salmon, renewable resources-

Subjects: Q - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics ; Environmental and Ecological Economics > Q2 - Renewable Resources and ConservationQ - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics ; Environmental and Ecological Economics > Q2 - Renewable Resources and Conservation > Q22 - Fishery ; AquacultureQ - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics ; Environmental and Ecological Economics > Q2 - Renewable Resources and Conservation > Q28 - Government Policy-





Author: Missios, Paul

Source: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/70748/







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