Local Taxation, Private-Public Consumption Complementarity, and the Optimal Number of Jurisdictions Report as inadecuate




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Abstract

Viewing local finances under the approach to private-public consumption complementarity, we conclude that foot voting and tax competition become extinct when the capital tax structure across jurisdictions is the one forging close ties between the burgher and his-her jurisdiction.
Feeling the burgher attached to the local public goods offered and to the local business activity, prevents labor and capital relocation.
The optimal number of jurisdictions is that which is conducive to the adoption of that local taxation that fosters such an attachment; taxation made possible by capitalizing upon private-public consumption complementarity.
The intuitive appeal of this result is then contemplated within the broader framework of fiscal policymaking accommodative of citizen heterogeneity.
In view of complementarity, there appears to be scope for decentralized treatment of citizen preferences via the localities, leaving the treatment of endowment differences to the central government



Item Type: MPRA Paper -

Original Title: Local Taxation, Private-Public Consumption Complementarity, and the Optimal Number of Jurisdictions-

Language: English-

Keywords: Local taxation, Private-public consumption complementarity, Citizen heterogeneity, Burgher-community attachment-

Subjects: H - Public Economics > H7 - State and Local Government ; Intergovernmental Relations > H71 - State and Local Taxation, Subsidies, and RevenueH - Public Economics > H7 - State and Local Government ; Intergovernmental Relations > H73 - Interjurisdictional Differentials and Their EffectsH - Public Economics > H7 - State and Local Government ; Intergovernmental Relations > H79 - Other-





Author: Soldatos, Gerasimos T.

Source: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/60861/



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