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Abstract

This paper studies incentives for cooperative research vis-à-vis non-cooperative research in an incomplete information framework. We show that with quantity competition under asymmetric information, the expected payoff from non-cooperative research goes down compared to the case of symmetric information; hence RJV incentives of the firms are larger under asymmetric information. In either case, however, the larger is the size of the cost-reducing innovation the lower is the incentive for cooperative research. Finally in our model, incomplete information does not affect the consumers’ welfare, but the firms become worse off.



Item Type: MPRA Paper -

Original Title: Cooperative vs. non-cooperative RandD incentives under incomplete information-

English Title: Cooperative vs. non-cooperative RandD incentives under incomplete information-

Language: English-

Keywords: Cooperative RandD, non-cooperative RandD, RJV, incomplete information, consumers’ welfare.-

Subjects: D - Microeconomics > D4 - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design > D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market ImperfectionL - Industrial Organization > L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance > L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect MarketsO - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth > O3 - Innovation ; Research and Development ; Technological Change ; Intellectual Property Rights > O31 - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives-





Author: Kabiraj, Tarun

Source: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/59259/



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