Language, Meaning, and Games: A Model of Communication, Coordination, and Evolution: Comment Report as inadecuate




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Abstract

Demichelis and Weibull 2008 AER show that adding lexicographic lying costs to coordination games with cheap talk yields a sharp prediction: only the efficient outcome is evolutionarily stable. I show that this result is caused by the discontinuity of preferences rather than by small lying costs per se. Finally, I discuss why discontinuity may not be an appealing assumption in evolutionary models.



Item Type: MPRA Paper -

Original Title: Language, Meaning, and Games: A Model of Communication, Coordination, and Evolution: Comment-

Language: English-

Keywords: Lexicographic preferences, evolutionary stability, cheap talk.-

Subjects: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games ; Evolutionary Games ; Repeated Games-





Author: Heller, Yuval

Source: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/53386/







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