When Parity Promotes Peace: Resolving Conflict Between Asymmetric Agents Report as inadecuate




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Abstract

Due to the high costs of conflict both in theory and practice, we examine and experimentally test the conditions under which conflict between asymmetric agents can be resolved. We model conflict as a two-agent rent-seeking contest for an indivisible prize. Before conflict arises, both agents may agree to allocate the prize by fair coin flip to avoid the costs of conflict. The model predicts that -parity promotes peace-: in the pure-strategy equilibrium, agents with relatively symmetric conflict capabilities agree to resolve the conflict by using a random device; however, with sufficiently asymmetric capabilities, conflicts are unavoidable because the stronger agent prefers to fight. The results of the experiment confirm that the availability of the random device partially eliminates conflicts when agents are relatively symmetric; however, the device also reduces conflict between substantially asymmetric agents.



Item Type: MPRA Paper -

Original Title: When Parity Promotes Peace: Resolving Conflict Between Asymmetric Agents-

Language: English-

Keywords: contest, asymmetries, conflict resolution, experiments-

Subjects: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C72 - Noncooperative GamesC - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C9 - Design of Experiments > C91 - Laboratory, Individual BehaviorD - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting BehaviorD - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D74 - Conflict ; Conflict Resolution ; Alliances ; Revolutions-





Author: Kimbrough, Erik

Source: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/52922/







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