An Economic Model of Tax Compliance with Individual Morality and Group Conformity Report as inadecuate




An Economic Model of Tax Compliance with Individual Morality and Group Conformity - Download this document for free, or read online. Document in PDF available to download.

Abstract

Scholars in public finance traditionally have analyzed tax compliance using the Allighman-Sandmo model. I include in this model both moral and social payoffs for compliance. This approach can explain four pieces of evidence that have not been explained by the traditional model, namely i high level of tax compliance; ii honest responses when individuals pay their taxes, even in the presence of high incentives for tax evasion; iii the level of evasion increases with the tax rate; and iv individuals are more likely to evade when they realize that there is a large number of evaders in society.



Item Type: MPRA Paper -

Original Title: An Economic Model of Tax Compliance with Individual Morality and Group Conformity-

English Title: An Economic Model of Tax Compliance with Individual Morality and Group Conformity-

Language: English-

Keywords: tax compliance, evasion, social norms, honesty, moral values,social interaction.-

Subjects: A - General Economics and Teaching > A1 - General Economics > A13 - Relation of Economics to Social ValuesH - Public Economics > H2 - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue > H24 - Personal Income and Other Nonbusiness Taxes and SubsidiesH - Public Economics > H2 - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue > H26 - Tax Evasion and Avoidance-





Author: Sour, Laura

Source: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/50334/







Related documents