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Abstract

In the current paper, we study the asymmetric normal-form game between two heterogeneous groups of populations by employing the stochastic replicator dynamics driven by Lévy process. A new game equilibrium, i.e., the game equilibrium of a stochastic differential cooperative game on time, is derived by introducing optimal-stopping technique into evolutionary game theory, which combines with the Pareto optimal standard leads us to the existence of Pareto optimal endogenous matching. Moreover, stability of the Pareto optimal endogenous matching is confirmed by essentially using the well-known Girsanov Theorem.



Item Type: MPRA Paper -

Original Title: On the existence and stability of Pareto optimal endogenous matching with fairness-

English Title: On the Existence and Stability of Pareto Optimal Endogenous Matching with Fairness-

Language: English-

Keywords: Stochastic differential cooperative game on time; Pareto optimal endogenous matching; Stable matching; Fairness; Induced game equilibrium; Stochastic replicator dynamics; Adaptive learning-

Subjects: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching TheoryC - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C70 - GeneralC - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C6 - Mathematical Methods ; Programming Models ; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling > C62 - Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium-





Author: Dai, Darong

Source: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/40457/







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