Are Overconfident CEOs Better Innovators Report as inadecuate




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Abstract

Using options- and press-based proxies for CEO overconfidence Malmendier and Tate 2005a, 2005b, 2008, we find that over the 1993-2003 period, firms with overconfident CEOs have greater return volatility, invest more in innovation, obtain more patents and patent citations, and achieve greater innovative success for given research and development RandD expenditure. Overconfident managers only achieve greater innovation than non-overconfident managers in innovative industries. Overconfidence is not associated with lower sales, ROA, or Q.



Item Type: MPRA Paper -

Original Title: Are Overconfident CEOs Better Innovators?-

Language: English-

Keywords: CEO Overconfidence; Innovation; RandD; Patent-

Subjects: M - Business Administration and Business Economics ; Marketing ; Accounting ; Personnel Economics > M5 - Personnel Economics > M52 - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their EffectsG - Financial Economics > G3 - Corporate Finance and Governance > G30 - GeneralM - Business Administration and Business Economics ; Marketing ; Accounting ; Personnel Economics > M4 - Accounting and Auditing > M40 - General-





Author: Hirshleifer, David

Source: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/22425/







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