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Reference: Thomas Norman, (2005). Dynamically Stable Sets in Infinite Strategy Spaces. Department of Economics (University of Oxford).Citable link to this page:

 

Dynamically Stable Sets in Infinite Strategy Spaces. Series: Discussion paper series

Abstract: Evolutionary game theory has largely focused on finite games. Dynamic stability isharder to attain in infinite strategy spaces; Bomze (Monatshefte fÄur Mathematik 110,1990, 189{206) and Oechssler and Riedel (Economic Theory 17, 2001, 141{162) provideconditions for the stability of rest points under the replicator dynamics. Here, conditionsare given for the stability of sets of strategies under this process.

Bibliographic Details

Issue Date: 2005Identifiers

Urn: uuid:292327e7-a37b-44be-9d8a-3db7954fc78e Item Description

Type: info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper;

Language: en

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Author: Thomas Norman - - - - Bibliographic Details Issue Date: 2005 - Identifiers Urn: uuid:292327e7-a37b-44be-9d8a-3db7954fc78e - - - I

Source: https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:292327e7-a37b-44be-9d8a-3db7954fc78e



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