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Reference: Lerman, Hemdat., (2005). Vision-based demonstratives. DPhil. University of Oxford.Citable link to this page:

 

Vision-based demonstratives

Abstract: How should we account for our ability to entertain simple, vision-based demonstrativethoughts about particular objects (that is, our ability to entertain thoughts aboutparticular objects simply on the basis of seeing them)? In this thesis I propose anaccount of this ability that accords with the common-sense view that seeing an objectputs one in a position to single it out by visually attending to it, and that this providesone with the ability to entertain demonstrative thoughts about it.An account of this type requires that we account for what it is to see a particularobject and to visually attend to it without appealing to particular demonstrativeabilities. However, it has been argued that a notion of seeing an object, and similarly anotion of attending to an object, which is accounted for in this way is unsuitable foraccounting for demonstrative abilities.I argue that there is no real problem: what we need is a notion of experiential contentwhich is concept-dependent only in a general manner. That is, the account of therelevant notion of experiential content requires appeal to the subject's conceptualabilities, but the account is not given in terms of specific conceptual abilities(especially, not specific demonstrative abilities). I then characterize a notion ofattention to a seen object which can be accounted for without appeal to particulardemonstrative abilities, and explain how attending to an object in the relevant senseprovides the subject with the ability to think about the object demonstratively.It is widely agreed that spatial location plays a central role in an account ofdemonstratives. I explain this role in terms of the role played by location in visualattention to the object and the subject's grasp of the fact that he attends to the object.

Type of Award:DPhil Level of Award:Doctoral Awarding Institution: University of Oxford Notes:This thesis was digitised thanks to the generosity of Dr Leonard Polonsky

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Professor John Campbell, Dr Naomi EilanMore by this contributor

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 Bibliographic Details

Issue Date: 2005Identifiers

Urn: uuid:e44728e4-ba4d-4555-bedf-ffe559880652

Source identifier: 602367974 Item Description

Type: Thesis;

Language: eng Subjects: Object (Philosophy) Perception (Philosophy) Tiny URL: td:602367974

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Author: Lerman, Hemdat. - institutionUniversity of Oxford institutionWolfson College University of Oxford facultyHumanities Division facu

Source: https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:e44728e4-ba4d-4555-bedf-ffe559880652



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