Critical dynamics in the evolution of stochastic strategies for the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma - Quantitative Biology > Populations and EvolutionReport as inadecuate




Critical dynamics in the evolution of stochastic strategies for the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma - Quantitative Biology > Populations and Evolution - Download this document for free, or read online. Document in PDF available to download.

Abstract: The observed cooperation on the level of genes, cells, tissues, andindividuals has been the object of intense study by evolutionary biologists,mainly because cooperation often flourishes in biological systems in apparentcontradiction to the selfish goal of survival inherent in Darwinian evolution.In order to resolve this paradox, evolutionary game theory has focused on thePrisoner-s Dilemma PD, which incorporates the essence of this conflict. Here,we encode strategies for the iterated Prisoner-s Dilemma IPD in terms ofconditional probabilities that represent the response of decision pathwaysgiven previous plays. We find that if these stochastic strategies are encodedas genes that undergo Darwinian evolution, the environmental conditions thatthe strategies are adapting to determine the fixed point of the evolutionarytrajectory, which could be either cooperation or defection. A transitionbetween cooperative and defective attractors occurs as a function of differentparameters such a mutation rate, replacement rate, and memory, all of whichaffect a player-s ability to predict an opponent-s behavior.



Author: Dimitris Iliopoulos, Arend Hintze, Christoph Adami

Source: https://arxiv.org/



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