Incentive payments, food safety and moral hazard in the supply chain Report as inadecuate




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This paper analyses an incentive payment-based approach to improving food safety in the supply chain. It develops a principal-agent model of the food supply chain in which the principal offers heterogeneous agents a payment to implement costly additional practices to improve food safety. It is shown that the presence or absence of the moral hazard problem affects the balance of benefits and costs from broadening the scope of the system from just lower cost larger agents to include higher cost smaller agents, thereby affecting the optimal design of the system. In particular, broadening the scope of the system to include smaller agents by increasing the size of the incentive payment can ameliorate the moral hazard problem among larger agents to the extent that this more costly approach is socially optimal.

Keywords: incentive payments ; moral hazard ; food safety ; supply chain

Subject(s): Demand and Price Analysis

Food Consumption/Nutrition/Food Safety

Issue Date: 2014-04

Publication Type: Conference Paper/ Presentation

PURL Identifier: http://purl.umn.edu/170525

Total Pages: 17

JEL Codes: D82; L51; Q18

Record appears in: Agricultural Economics Society > 88th Annual Conference, April 9-11, 2014, AgroParisTech, Paris, France





Author: Fraser, Rob ; Hussein, Mohamud

Source: http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/170525?ln=en







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