TRANSACTION COSTS, RISK AVERSION, AND CHOICE OF TENURE REVISITED Report as inadecuate




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The related questions of how tenants and landlords choose leasing contracts and how these contracts affect efficient allocation of resources continue to divide economists This article rejects answers suggested by transaction cost models developed by Cheung and by Ip and Stahl and argues that among risk-averse farmers, contract choice is determined by the relative intensities of tenant and landlord aversion to risk The risk model examined here suggested that all contract forms - whether fixed rent, fixed wage, or crop share - can generally achieve the same allocative efficiency

Keywords: Leasing contracts ; Tenure ; Allocative efficiency ; Transaction costs

Subject(s): Demand and Price Analysis

Research Methods/ Statistical Methods

Risk and Uncertainty

Issue Date: 1980-04

Publication Type: Journal Article

PURL Identifier: http://purl.umn.edu/148631 Published in: Agricultural Economics Research, Volume 32, Number 2 Page range: 26-35

Total Pages: 10

Record appears in: United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) > Economic Research Service > Agricultural Economics Research





Author: Baron, Donald

Source: http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/148631?ln=en







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