QUALITY MEASUREMENT AND RISK-SHARING IN CONTRACTS FOR CALIFORNIA FRUITS AND VEGETABLES Report as inadecuate




QUALITY MEASUREMENT AND RISK-SHARING IN CONTRACTS FOR CALIFORNIA FRUITS AND VEGETABLES - Download this document for free, or read online. Document in PDF available to download.

We hypothesize that imperfect quality measurement in contracts for fresh fruits and vegetables results in a moral-hazard problem, and that the final price of the produce provides additional information regarding quality. As a consequence, growers are not shielded from all price risk. This hypothesis is tested informally with observations on actual contracts in California.

Subject(s): Demand and Price Analysis

Risk and Uncertainty

Issue Date: 1998

Publication Type: Conference Paper/ Presentation

PURL Identifier: http://purl.umn.edu/20957

Total Pages: 12

Series Statement: Selected Paper

Record appears in: American Agricultural Economics Association (AAEA) > 1998 Annual meeting, August 2-5, Salt Lake City, UT





Author: Hueth, Brent ; Ligon, Ethan

Source: http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/20957?ln=en



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