Climate Change and Game Theory: a Mathematical Survey Report as inadecuate

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This paper examines the problem of achieving global cooperation to reduce greenhousegas emissions. Contributions to this problem are reviewed from noncooperative gametheory, cooperative game theory, and implementation theory. We examine the solutionsto games where players have a continuous choice about how much to pollute, andgames where players make decisions about treaty participation. The implications oflinking cooperation on climate change with cooperation on other issues, such as trade, isalso examined. Cooperative and non-cooperative approaches to coalition formation areinvestigated in order to examine the behaviour of coalitions cooperating on climatechange. One way to achieve cooperation is to design a game, known as a mechanism,whose equilibrium corresponds to an optimal outcome. This paper examines somemechanisms that are based on conditional commitments, and their policy implications.These mechanisms could make cooperation on climate change mitigation more likely.

Keywords: Climate change negotiations ; game theory ; implementationtheory ; coalition formation ; subgame perfect equilibrium

Subject(s): Environmental Economics and Policy

Issue Date: 2010-10

Publication Type: Working or Discussion Paper

PURL Identifier:

Total Pages: 41

Record appears in: Australian National University > Centre for Climate Economics & Policy (CCEP) > Working Papers

Author: Wood, Peter John



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