Frugal and Truthful Auctions for Vertex Covers, Flows, and Cuts - Computer Science > Computational ComplexityReport as inadecuate




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Abstract: We study truthful mechanisms for hiring a team of agents in three classes ofset systems: Vertex Cover auctions, k-flow auctions, and cut auctions. ForVertex Cover auctions, the vertices are owned by selfish and rational agents,and the auctioneer wants to purchase a vertex cover from them. For k-flowauctions, the edges are owned by the agents, and the auctioneer wants topurchase k edge-disjoint s-t paths, for given s and t. In the same setting, forcut auctions, the auctioneer wants to purchase an s-t cut. Only the agents knowtheir costs, and the auctioneer needs to select a feasible set and paymentsbased on bids made by the agents.We present constant-competitive truthful mechanisms for all three setsystems. That is, the maximum overpayment of the mechanism is within a constantfactor of the maximum overpayment of any truthful mechanism, for every setsystem in the class. The mechanism for Vertex Cover is based on scaling eachbid by a multiplier derived from the dominant eigenvector of a certain matrix.The mechanism for k-flows prunes the graph to be minimally k+1-connected, andthen applies the Vertex Cover mechanism. Similarly, the mechanism for cutscontracts the graph until all s-t paths have length exactly 2, and then appliesthe Vertex Cover mechanism.



Author: David Kempe, Mahyar Salek, Cristopher Moore

Source: https://arxiv.org/







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