UNANIMOUS IMPLEMENTATION: A CASE FOR APPROVAL MECHANISMSReport as inadecuate




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1 Université Paris-Dauphine 2 University of Cyprus Nicosia

Abstract : We design the class of indirect Approval mechanisms which allow the players’strategies to coincide with the subsets of the outcome space. By focusing on the single-peakeddomain, we prove that: a Each of these mechanisms is characterized by a unique equilibriumoutcome, and b for almost every implementable welfare optimum outcome of a socialchoice rule, including the Condorcet winner alternative, there exists an Approval mechanismthat unanimously implements it. That is, Approval mechanisms help a society achieve everyfeasible welfare goal, and, perhaps more importantly, they promote social coherence: Theimplemented outcome is approved by everyone.

Keywords : Indirect Mechanisms Nash Implementation Strategy-proof Unanimity





Author: Matias Nunez - Dimitrios Xefteris -

Source: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/



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