Oversized government coalitions in latin america Report as inadecuate




Oversized government coalitions in latin america - Download this document for free, or read online. Document in PDF available to download.

Brazilian Political Science Review 2016, 10 3

Author: Fernando Meireles

Source: http://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=394348912001


Teaser



Brazilian Political Science Review E-ISSN: 1981-3821 bpsr@bpsr.org.br Associação Brasileira de Ciência Política Brasil Meireles, Fernando Oversized Government Coalitions in Latin America Brazilian Political Science Review, vol.
10, núm.
3, 2016, pp.
1-31 Associação Brasileira de Ciência Política São Paulo, Brasil Available in: http:--www.redalyc.org-articulo.oa?id=394348912001 How to cite Complete issue More information about this article Journals homepage in redalyc.org Scientific Information System Network of Scientific Journals from Latin America, the Caribbean, Spain and Portugal Non-profit academic project, developed under the open access initiative Oversized Government Coalitions in Latin America* Fernando Meireles Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais, Brazil Research on executive-legislative relations in presidential systems have emphasized how presidents use cabinet appointments to form and manage government coalitions in the absence of majority legislative support.
Yet not all coalitions are similar, as some are larger and, consequently, more prone to agency and coordination problems than others.
But what shapes presidents’ decision to include more parties in their coalitions? While several hypotheses exist in the literature, few have been tested in a systematic fashion, none focusing on why surplus coalitions form.
This article intends to fill this gap by examining an original time-series cross-sectional dataset comprising 168 unique coalitions in all 18 Latin American presidential countries since 1979.
In particular, I find that highly fragmented party systems and presidents with great legislative powers are more likely to generate oversized government coalitions.
An additional analysis, with monthly data from Brazilian cabinets between 1989 and 2010, also shows that supermajority rules and bicameralism dynamics play a role in the occurrence of surplus coalitions, but party discipline and presidential approval do not. Keywords: Governm...





Related documents