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Thiago Silva ; Marcelo Vieira ;Brazilian Political Science Review 2016, 10 2

Author: Victor Araújo

Source: http://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=394346640007


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Brazilian Political Science Review E-ISSN: 1981-3821 bpsr@bpsr.org.br Associação Brasileira de Ciência Política Brasil Araújo, Victor; Silva, Thiago; Vieira, Marcelo Measuring Presidential Dominance over Cabinets in Presidential Systems: Constitutional Design and Power Sharing Brazilian Political Science Review, vol.
10, núm.
2, 2016, pp.
1-23 Associação Brasileira de Ciência Política São Paulo, Brasil Available in: http:--www.redalyc.org-articulo.oa?id=394346640007 How to cite Complete issue More information about this article Journals homepage in redalyc.org Scientific Information System Network of Scientific Journals from Latin America, the Caribbean, Spain and Portugal Non-profit academic project, developed under the open access initiative Measuring Presidential Dominance over Cabinets in Presidential Systems: Constitutional Design and Power Sharing* Victor Araújo Universidade de São Paulo, Brazil Thiago Silva Texas A&M University, United States Marcelo Vieira Universidade Federal do Espírito Santo, Brazil This study focuses on the degree of political dominance exercised on cabinets by the executive chief in presidential systems. According to a debate that began in the 1990s, presidential systems are characterized by a non-collegial decision-making process, led by and personified in the figure of the president, in contrast to parliamentary systems where a joint decision-making process is prevalent.
The key argument of this research note is that, although the majority of presidents have the constitutional power to remove cabinet ministers, the executive decision-making process in presidential systems is not necessarily vertical or based on a noncollegial process.
By building a new index, we reveal a significant variation in the executive power exerted by presidents over their cabinets.
To classify the degree of political dominance of presidents over their cabinets, we analyzed the rules of cabinet decision-making processes as defined in 18 ...





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