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Abstract: We show that strategy independent adaptations of random interaction networkscan induce powerful mechanisms, ranging from the Red Queen to group selection,that promote cooperation in evolutionary social dilemmas. These two mechanismsemerge spontaneously as dynamical processes due to deletions and additions oflinks, which are performed whenever players adopt new strategies and after acertain number of game iterations, respectively. The potency of cooperationpromotion, as well as the mechanism responsible for it, can thereby be tunedvia a single parameter determining the frequency of link additions. We thusdemonstrate that coevolving random networks may evoke an appropriate mechanismfor each social dilemma, such that cooperation prevails even by highlyunfavorable conditions.



Author: Attila Szolnoki, Matjaz Perc

Source: https://arxiv.org/







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